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ABSTRACT 
Each day, more than fifteen hundred illegal immigrants enter the United 
States through the tribal lands of the Tohono O’odham Nation, and more than 
twenty-five other tribes also have land on or near the international borders or 
shorelines of the United States. Beyond borders, tribal lands cover fifty-six million 
acres of trust lands that include a wide variety of national critical infrastructure, 
that often provide the backbone of non-tribal regional infrastructure.  Although 
federal-tribal relationships have long been rooted in a unique relationship defined 
by the sovereignty of each government, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
defines tribal governments as local governments.  The shift virtually ignores 
decades of treaties and U.S. Supreme Court rulings that established the special 
relationship between tribes and the federal government. Despite the recent 
addition of the word ‘tribal’ to many Department of Homeland Security 
documents, this action fails to outline the mechanisms for collaboration with tribal 
governments in homeland security programs that adequately reflect and build 
upon the sovereign status of tribal governments.  This research reviews aspects 
of social trust required for collaboration, explores successful federal-tribal 
collaboration efforts, and suggests legislative and policy changes that may 
provide mechanisms necessary for effective federal-tribal collaboration in 
homeland security. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Terrorism, like wildfires and earthquakes, doesn’t recognize federal, 
state or local government jurisdiction. But terrorist might use the 
gaps in security on Indian lands, against all of us. Tribes do not 
want to be the weak link in the chain, we stand ready to serve our 
country and homeland, and ask only that Congress give us the 
means. 
    — Anthony Picco, Chairman, Viejas Band of Kumeyaay Indians 
 
A. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Each day, more than fifteen hundred illegal immigrants enter the United 
States through the tribal lands of the Tohono O’odham Nation1.  As a result, 
Tohono O’odham currently spends more than $7 million annually toward 
homeland security issues related to illegal immigration and medical care for 
illegal immigrants.2  More than twenty-five other tribes, according to Terry Virden, 
Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, also have land on or near the 
international borders or shorelines of the United States.  These are just some of 
the challenges that tribal nations across the country face in preparing for and 
responding to homeland security risks.3 
Beyond borders, tribal lands cover fifty-six million acres of trust lands that 
include a wide variety of national critical infrastructure.  Dams, water 
impoundments and reservoirs, electrical generation plants, drinking water, and 
wastewater systems situated on tribal lands often provide the backbone of non-
tribal regional infrastructure.  Although critical, tribal governments are ill equipped 
to protect this infrastructure.  Tribal law enforcement is notoriously under-staffed 
                                            
1 Vivian Juan-Saunders, Chairperson Tohono O’odham Nation, Testimony to the Senate 
Committee on Indian Affairs regarding S.578, 108th Congress, Session 1 (July 30, 2003). 
2 Ibid. 
3 . Terry Virden, Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Testimony to the Senate Committee on 
Indian Affairs regarding S.578, 108th Congress, Session 1 (July 30, 2003). 
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and under-equipped, and is rarely well integrated with non-tribal agencies.  Tribal 
governments also have minimal emergency response and medical capacities, 
and are hard-pressed to afford appropriate planning teams.4 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, brought the realities of 
terrorism home to those Americans who had previously viewed terrorism as a 
problem overseas.  In passing The Homeland Security Act in 2002 (Public Law 
107-296), Congress sought to foster inter-governmental collaboration as a 
means to improve the ability of the United States to secure itself against threats 
at home.  The act required the consolidation of twenty-two disparate federal 
agencies into one department and laid out guidelines for interagency and 
intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration throughout the country.  The 
Homeland Security Act was the foundation upon which the National Security 
Strategy and subsequent homeland security policies were structured.   
The act, however, altered a long-standing foundation for collaboration 
between tribal and federal governments, which has the potential of weakening 
rather than strengthening cooperation on homeland security.  Although federal-
tribal relationships have long been rooted in a unique relationship defined by the 
sovereignty of each government, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 treats tribal 
governments the same as local governments.  The shift virtually ignores decades 
of treaties and U.S. Supreme Court rulings that established the special 
relationship between tribes and the federal government.5   
This change in the legislative definition of the relationship has fundamental 
consequences for homeland security.  For instance, until very recently, the new 
definition in the act did not allow for direct funding of tribal governments in 
homeland security budget distributions.  It also did not provide for consultation 
and collaboration of tribal governments when developing homeland security 
                                            
4 National Native American Law Enforcement Association (NNALEA), Tribal Lands Homeland 
Security Report (Washington, DC, 2003), 1. 
5 J. P. Kalt and J. W. Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty; The Law and 
Economics of Indian Self-Rule (Harvard University Faculty Research Working Papers Series, 
March 2004), section II. A. 
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policy.  As pseudo-local entities, tribal governments had to work through various 
levels of government to reach federal policy and planning attention.  Tribes were 
even required to apply through the states for homeland security money. 
Tribes were also obstructed from engaging in the direct cooperation and 
collaboration that had long characterized their unique status.  Many tribes, such 
as the Navajo Nation, cover areas in three states as well as an international 
border.  Coordination through multiple states makes their strategies and 
collaborative efforts disjointed and difficult at best.  With federal-tribal relations 
required to pass through states, tribal governments’ concerns and needs related 
to Homeland Security were mediated by interagency relationships where they 
had no history of working together.  Federal aid, in turn, flowed back through 
intergovernmental layers at state, regional and local levels. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to review and highlight the problems that 
emerge from this homeland security-inspired realignment of the strategic 
relationship between federal and tribal governments.  Any account of the 
situation of tribal governments in the United States, of course, must confront the 
history and persistent problems associated with the lack of trust in these 
relationships.  In turn, the thesis examines ways in which the federal government 
could establish the social trust upon which effective collaboration and 
cooperation rests.  Specifically, what types of measures related to homeland 
security strategy could include tribal governments in ways that respect and 
reinforce the historical relationships among sovereign, if dependent, nations?  
How would these improved relationships strengthen tribal governments’ 
contributions to protecting the entire United States from terrorist attacks and their 
consequences?       
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C. REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Tribal sovereignty was originally established through treaties between the 
United States government and various Indian Nations.  These treaties, Kalt and 
Singer point out, “did not and do not absorb the tribes into the United States; 
rather, the reverse is true. The treaties recognize and preserve tribal sovereignty: 
In return for giving up almost all the land in the U.S., the U.S. made promises to 
the tribes.
 
It promised to respect their rights over reserved land,
 
and to recognize 
that those lands would be governed by tribes, not by the state governments. 
Those tribes that did not sign treaties were similarly protected by the doctrine that 
inherent sovereignty is to be respected by the United States.”6 
Sovereignty, as a principle for tribal-federal relationships, has been upheld 
in the courts and supported by every Administration since 1960.  On November 
5, 2000, for instance, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13175, which 
restated the core principles: 
The United States has a unique legal relationship with Indian tribal 
governments as set forth in the Constitution of the United States, 
treaties, statutes, Executive Orders, and court decisions. Since the 
formation of the Union, the United States has recognized Indian 
tribes as domestic dependent nations under its protection.7 
This legal framework outlines that, for the purpose of homeland security, the 
federal government has a requirement to protect tribal nations as sovereign 
domestic entities.  This federal obligation is direct and does not devolve to 
requirements facing state or local governments.  Protection is also a federal 
responsibility, and does not require tribal governments to work through state and 
local governments to receive federal protection. 
 
                                            
6 Kalt and Singer,  9 
7 William J. Clinton, Executive Order #13175: Consultation and Coordination with Indian 
Tribal Governments (November 6, 2000). 
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While tribal governments, as sovereign entities, are under the protection of 
the United States, the Homeland Security Act and various post-9/11 legislation 
and directives have not sought to enhance collaboration along these lines.  
Rather, as tribes have expressed in numerous venues, efforts at collaboration 
and cooperation have been minimal.  Senator Inouye, for instance, introduced a 
bill (S. 578) intended to correct the definition of tribal governments as local 
governments within the Homeland Security Act of 2002.  Despite Senate 
hearings and vivid testimony by tribal leadership, the bill never progressed 
through Congress to become law.    
In case there was any doubt, tribal governmental leaders and advocates 
have continuously expressed their strong desire to become involved in homeland 
security.  As one advocate argued:   
We Indians have always fought to protect our homeland. We 
always will. We ask the United States government to open its eyes 
to the contributions the tribes have made, and will continue to 
make, if we have the means to do so. Tribes share borders with 
other nations, with major infrastructure and with the open seas. 
Military reserves are our neighbors and we have jurisdiction over 
many natural treasures. Give us the tools and we, too, will help 
keep America safe for the generations to come.8 
Tribal association reports continuously highlight the collaboration of tribal 
governments with each other to identify border, immigration, public health and 
other homeland security considerations on tribal lands. The National Native 
American Law Enforcement Association (NNALEA), for example, has held tribal 
summits focused on homeland security.  The National Congress of American 
Indians (NCAI) has also held meetings to identify homeland security issues on 
tribal lands.  Congressional testimony during hearings for S. 578, Tribal 
Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, also clearly 
                                            
8  Billy Frank, Jr., Nisqually Indian Chairman, Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, USMC 
Veteran, Korean War. 
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outlined the vulnerabilities that exist within tribal lands and the need and desire 
for tribal involvement in homeland security planning.9  
Addressing specific homeland security issues, NNALEA and NCAI have 
analyzed current border security issues on tribal lands.10  Their report details 
border issues and their cascading effects such as increased crime rates related 
to drug smuggling that affect national security.  These problems are in large part 
exacerbated by the lack of federal government collaboration with tribal 
governments. As a reflection of their concern over this issue, tribal governments 
participated extensively in the border study.  Of the forty-one tribes identified in 
the study as having lands within one hundred miles of a northern or southern 
international border, forty tribes participated in these deliberations11.  The report 
also highlights the absence of federal collaboration with tribal governments and 
identifies the consequences of significant coordination gaps with the federal 
government.  In particular, these gaps weaken homeland security.  For instance, 
despite a combined total of 2.3 million non-natives reported crossing international 
tribal borders, 67.74 percent of the participating tribes reported that they do not 
have a specific strategy for protecting their respective borders primarily due to a 
lack of resources.12   
The tribes’ spirit of concern and cooperation, and the recognition of the 
need for collaboration, are strikingly at odds with the actions of the federal 
government to respond to the risks and vulnerabilities on tribal lands.  Among the 
many bills reviewed by the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs that mention tribal government involvement in homeland security, tribal 
involvement is not described in any detail.  Close comparison of texts, for 
instance, shows that legislators have simply added the word tribal to the phrase 
                                            
9 S 578 Tribal Government Amendments to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Hearings 
before the Committee on Indian Affairs, July 30, 2003. 
10 NNALEA, Indian Country Border Security and Tribal Interoperability Pilot Program (TBS 
Pilot Program), March 31, 2006, Washington, DC. 
11 Ibid., 6. 
12 Ibid., 17. 
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state, local, and tribal government.   These bills fail to outline the mechanisms for 
cooperation or collaboration with tribal governments in homeland security 
programs that adequately reflect and build upon the sovereign status of tribal 
governments.   
An exception occurred in 2006, when Representative Frank Pallone Jr. of 
New Jersey introduced H.R.4871.  The Tribal Government Homeland Security 
Coordination and Integration Act outlined the requirements for establishment of 
an Office of Tribal Government Homeland Security within the Department of 
Homeland Security. Within this Act, the Tribal Government Homeland Security 
Office was assigned responsibility for coordination and integration of Tribal 
governments within homeland security programs to include prevention, 
protection, and response activities planning.  The Act also called for the 
treatment of tribal governments as state governments for the purposes of 
developing funding methodologies, planning, consultation, coordination, and 
eligibility for grant money.  The Act was sent for review to the House Resources 
Committee and the House Homeland Security Committee.  The fate of the Bill 
underscored the difficulties facing tribal governments as they seek to collaborate 
with the federal government.  Congress failed to act on the bill and it was cleared 
from the books at the completion of the 109th Congress.13 
More recently, a bill introduced in the House by Republican Bennie 
Thompson on January 5, 2007, quickly cleared both the House and Senate and 
became Public Law 110-053 on August 3, 2007.14 The law, entitled “To provide 
for the implementation of the recommendations of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” amends The Homeland Security Act of 
2002 in ways that allow some tribal governments to apply for homeland security 
grant funding.  In doing so, the law makes a new distinction among tribes.  It 
                                            
13 Congress, Tribal Government Homeland Security Coordination and Integration Act. H.R. 
4871,109th U. S. Congress, 2nd Session  http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/D?c109:1:./temp/~mdbs0nRwgH  (accessed August 25, 2007). 
14 Congress, Public Law 110-053, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 2007. 
 8
designates “directly eligible tribes” and “Indian tribes” based on eligibility to 
receive federal grant dollars for homeland security.  The changes are as follows: 
 
(4) DIRECTLY ELIGIBLE TRIBE.—The term “directly eligible tribe” 
means: 
 (A) any Indian tribe— 
 (i) that is located in the continental United States; 
 (ii) that operates a law enforcement or emergency response 
agency with the capacity to respond to calls for law enforcement or 
emergency services; 
 (iii)(I) that is located on or near an international border or a 
coastline bordering an ocean (including the Gulf of Mexico) or 
international waters; 
 (II) that is located within 10 miles of a system or asset 
included on the prioritized critical infrastructure list established 
under section 210E(a)(2) or has such a system or asset within its 
territory; 
 (III) that is located within or contiguous to 1 of the 50 most 
populous metropolitan statistical areas in the United States; or 
 (IV) the jurisdiction of which includes not less than 1,000 
square miles of Indian country, as that term is defined in section 
1151 of title 18, United States Code; and 
 (iv) that certifies to the Secretary that a State has not 
provided funds under section 2003 or 2004 to the Indian tribe or 
consortium of Indian tribes for the purpose for which direct funding 
is sought; and 
 (B) a consortium of Indian tribes, if each tribe satisfies the 
requirements of subparagraph (A).”15   
 
The new law then goes on to provide a separate definition for Indian tribe: 
 ‘‘(7) INDIAN TRIBE.—The  term ‘Indian tribe’ has the meaning 
given that term in section 4(e) of the Indian Self-Determination 
Act (25 U.S.C. 450b(e)).16 
                                            
15 Congress, Public Law 110-053, Title I, section 101,  
16 Ibid. 
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These new definitions are applied only to the Homeland Security Grants 
section of the new legislation.  Nowhere else in the new law, beyond the issue of 
grants, is the definition of tribal governments amended from its original treatment 
of tribes as local governments, as expressed in The Homeland Security Act of 
2002.  The original wording of the definition of tribal governments as local 
governments within the Homeland Security Act of 2002 is as follows: 
 
(10) The term ‘‘local government’’ means: 
(A) a county, municipality, city, town, township, local public 
authority, school district, special district, intrastate district, council of 
governments (regardless of whether the council of governments is 
incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under State law), regional 
or interstate government entity, or agency or instrumentality of a 
local government; 
(B) an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization, or in Alaska a 
Native village or Alaska Regional Native Corporation; and 
(C) a rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other 
public entity.17 
 
Although the new definition and distinction — between “directly eligible 
tribes” and “Indian tribes” — at least opens up a channel of direct communication 
for a few select tribes, it has limited value in closing homeland security gaps on 
tribal lands.  The purpose of the law appears to focus on determining which tribes 
may apply for homeland security grant funding and which do not qualify. No 
distinctions are made between states as sovereign governments to determine 
which states may apply for funding and which may not.  States that do not share 
international borders or do not contain critical infrastructure are not precluded 
from applying for homeland security grants.  They may receive less money based 
on the federal risk assessment formula, but they are not barred from the grant 
proposal process altogether.  
                                            
17 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, November 25, 2002, Definitions, 
Section 2 (10). 
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Even defined as “directly eligible tribes,” the tribal governments must first 
apply through a state, and then show that the state did not provide funding, 
before they may apply to the Homeland Security Grant Program for funding.  
Those “Indian tribes” that are not defined as directly eligible are simply out of the 
system entirely.  The new law then proceeds to sprinkle the word “tribal” 
throughout the amendment by adding it to the phrase “state, local, and tribal.”  In 
essence, the new law does little to improve the grant funding opportunities for 
tribal governments.  They must still apply through the states first, and states are 
not demonstrably more successful than the federal government in their outreach 
and cooperation with tribal governments.  In a National Governor’s Association 
survey completed in April 2006, for instance, only 57 percent of states that have 
tribes have invited their tribal government leaders to participate in the state 
strategic planning and grant process.18     
D. ARGUMENT 
The consequences of the treatment of tribal-federal relationships in the 
aftermath of 9/11 are extensive and may undermine the goal of increasing 
homeland security preparedness.  Tribal governments’ sovereign rights have 
been instrumental to the wellbeing of their communities.19  Legally supported 
tribal rights have protected tribes from detrimental, regional political and 
economic pressures.  Tribal self-government has also helped to improve 
socioeconomic wellbeing in the face of declining federal budgetary support.  
Tribal sovereignty, far from a weakness in intergovernmental cooperation for 
homeland security, may be the core principle for collaboration that reaps the 
benefits of participation of critical partners. 
                                            
18 National Governors Association, Washington, DC, 2006 Homeland Security Director’s 
Survey, April 3, 2006, http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/0604HLSDIRSURVEY.pdf.   
19 Kalt and Singer, Myths and Realities.  
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At the Tribal Lands Homeland Security Summit in 2002, a collection of 
tribal government leaders and advocates outlined five goals for tribal government 
participation in homeland security:20   
• Understand the threat 
• Define the vulnerabilities 
• Identify resources 
• Identify mechanisms for cooperation  
• Define the next steps for moving forward 
The goals specifically identified the need for effective collaboration to 
close the strategic and tactical holes apparent between federal and state 
preparedness.  These strategic and tactical holes related to border security 
control, critical infrastructure protection, public health response, and other 
emergency response capabilities. Tribal governments not only want to be fully 
involved in homeland security, they realize they must be involved to provide full 
protection to the United States.  
Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell of the Northern Cheyenne Tribe 
expressed the spirit and goal of tribal participation this way:  “Native people are 
Americans first – and want to stand shoulder to shoulder with the rest of their 
countrymen in defending American lives and homelands from the threats now 
before us.”21   
E. METHODOLOGY 
The history of tribal-federal relationships is certainly complex and full of 
deep tensions, conflicts, and mistrust.  If lack of collaboration obstructs homeland 
security preparedness, a strategic goal for the federal government should be to 
overcome these difficulties.  The primary goal of this thesis is to examine how to 
                                            
20 NNALEA, Tribal Lands Homeland Security Report, 2. 
21 Ibid., 3 
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reach that strategic goal.  In Chapter II, I begin by focusing on the systemic 
obstacles to collaboration.  In particular, I focus on the historical and structural 
dimensions of mistrust between tribal and federal governments.  Chapter III 
updates these dimensions of mistrust, outlines overall, conceptual elements of 
social trust behaviors, and examines ways in which social trust has become 
essential to a wide range of interagency and intergroup relationships.  These 
elements of social trust must improve if we are to address the government-to-
government relationship problems and subsequent homeland security gaps 
created by this lack of social trust. 
Chapter IV provides examples of where the tribal and federal government-
to-government relationship is working effectively for some programs.  In addition, 
it offers a few cases where state and tribal relationships are developing in the 
absence of federal guidance for homeland security.  In Chapter V, social trust 
elements are tied to legislative and policy actions that may improve the federal 




II. COLLABORATION AND SOCIAL TRUST 
A. COLLABORATION IN HOMELAND SECURITY 
Effective collaboration is necessary for national security and mandated 
through the National Preparedness Goal, National Priority: Expand Regional 
Collaboration.22  The meaning of collaboration, used twenty-one times within the 
Goal document, varies depending on the user and purpose. Its core meaning and 
intent within homeland security, however, is simple — the “act of working jointly. 
“23      
“Acting jointly” — collaboration — has been the focus of much discussion 
and research on how best to accomplish homeland security goals both because 
of the stinging criticism of the 9/11 Commission’s report on the federal 
government’s failure to “connect the dots” and the growing recognition that the 
enormous costs of preparedness requires joining forces.  Collaboration is 
required by DHS in grant programs as outlined in the FY2006 Homeland Security 
Grant Program: Program Guidance and Application Kit:24  “Each mission area 
includes a collection of capabilities that require integration and collaboration 
across multiple disciplines, jurisdictions, levels of government, processes, and 
procedures.”25  
How these collections of capabilities are organized across jurisdictions, 
however, fundamentally matters for the success of the joint effort.  The sovereign 
status of states is well recognized, for instance, when mutual aid agreements are 
                                            
22 Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Goal (Washington, DC, 
Department of Homeland Security, December 2005), 15. 
23  Webster’s Dictionary http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definition/collaboration, 
accessed June 23, 2007. 
24 Department of Homeland Security, FY2006 Homeland Security Grant Program: Program 
Guidance and Application Kit, Washington, DC (Department of Homeland Security, December 
2005). 
25 Ibid., 3.  
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negotiated across state lines.  Until recently, the annual DHS funding to states 
provided few means for combinations of jurisdictions to pursue collective, cross-
jurisdictional projects.  The sovereignty status of tribes has not been specifically 
recognized in any of these efforts, even though the jurisdictional status and 
collaborative structure between tribal and federal governments pose some of the 
most contentious and delicate problems in the nation’s history.  Defining away 
cross-boundary, multi-jurisdictional problems that arise from the value of 
including tribal governments undercuts the stated goal of fostering collaboration 
in homeland security.        
B. SOCIAL TRUST AND COLLABORATION 
Social trust is an important component necessary for effective 
collaboration.  As outlined in a study by The Century Foundation, both 
competition and distrust between federal, state, and local governments are 
significant barriers to developing effective collaboration in homeland security 
efforts.26  Although money was often identified as a point of need for effective 
homeland security actions, Kettl points out that without better collaboration 
between the state and local governments, money alone will not improve the 
abilities of the states to prevent or respond to disaster events, whether manmade 
or natural.  Funding is definitely necessary to increase assets and capacity at 
both the state and local levels, but the competition for the limited funding 
impedes the collaboration necessary to ensure the governments work 
seamlessly together for prevention and response activities. Improved trust 
between participants is necessary for collaboration to result in successful 
prevention and preparation activities.  In a paper prepared for the Office of 
Domestic Preparedness through the Naval Postgraduate School, Hocevar et al., 
reiterate the point that distrust between federal, state, and local agencies is a 
                                            
26 Donald Kettl, The States and Homeland Security: Building the Missing Link (The Century 
Foundation, New York, New York, 2003). 
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strong barrier to effective collaboration.27  Interestingly, neither of these papers 
mention tribal governments as an organization to include in collaborative 
activities.  The lack of social trust discussed in these documents is significantly 
magnified between DHS and tribal governments. 
Yet, what is social trust?  Jordan Boslego, with the Harvard International 
Review states, “A precise definition of social trust is difficult to pin down, but it 
has been encapsulated as an ongoing motivation or impetus for social relations 
that forms a basis for interaction.”28  He further states,  
Your only basis for whether to trust or distrust a complete stranger 
is your social conditioning, which may be influenced by your ethnic 
or cultural group, the characteristics and values of the society in 
which you live or grew up, your past experiences, and — more 
broadly — the historical tradition of your country.29 
Boslego’s definition of social trust clearly puts the historical pattern of 
conflict and tension between tribal and federal governments at the forefront of a 
discussion of collaboration in homeland security.  The historical experience of 
tribal governments is that by reaching out and giving an inch, they were stripped 
of a mile — or, in their case, millions of square miles.30  In his paper, “September 
11 and America’s War on Terrorism,” Wickham describes the American policy of 
manifest destiny that drove many tribes to the point of extinction.31  The history of 
broken treaties and actions to deliberately mislead the indigenous people of the 
United States pervades this historical accounting. Wickham states, “Most 
scholars agree that manifest destiny ranks high among those reasons that 
displaced any hope of benevolent federal Indian policies in the nineteenth 
                                            
27 Susan Hocevar, Erik Jansen, and Gail Fann Thomas, Building Collabrative Capacity for 
Homeland Security (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, November 2004). 
28 Jordan Boslego, Engineering Social Trust: What Can Communities and Institutions Do? 
(Harvard International Review: International Health 27, no. 1, Spring 2005), 1. 
29 Ibid, 2. 
30 John A. Wickham, September 11 and America’s War on Terrorism (American Indian 
Quarterly 26. no. 1, Winter 2002, 128. 
31 Ibid., 116-144. 
 16
century and facilitated policies of land theft, genocide, and ethnocide.”32  At a 
time when security of the entire country is at stake, how tribes are included in 
current national strategies is, to some extent, a measure and a reflection of how 
far relations between tribal governments and the federal government has 
evolved. 
The diversity of relationships between the federal government and tribes 
has long, deep roots in North American history.  So too, has the erosion of social 
trust between the federal and tribal governments.  In a paper titled, “Exploiting 
Tribal Networks Through Conflict,” Joseph Peterson outlines tactics used to turn 
tribal governments against each other in order for an adversary to gain the 
advantage.33  Within the paper, Peterson clearly outlines the historical use of the 
“Divide and Exploit”34 tactic as well as the “Divide and Distract”35 tactic employed 
by the early settlers of North America to conquer the Native Americans.  
Peterson outlines the detail of the early European tactic of “Divide and Exploit,” 
summing it up as follows: 
 …opportunity had presented itself to the New England colonies in 
the form of tribal in-fighting, local political ambitions, and active 
regional enmities. The colonists seized on these opportunities in 
order to offset their own martial and logistic shortfalls and achieve 
their objectives of survival and territorial security. To this end, they 
encouraged Indians to fight Indians. The colonies were effectively 
defended and territory secured.36 
He then outlines the intricacies of the tactic of “Divide and Exploit,” summing it up 
as follows: 
 
                                            
32 Wickham, 118. 
33 Joseph Peterson, Exploiting Tribal Networks Through Conflict, Naval Postgraduate 
School, September, 2006.  
34 Ibid., 14-18. 
35 Ibid., 18-24. 
36 Ibid., 18. 
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…opportunities to maintain control and influence rivals arose out of 
conflict. From conflict, critical social and economic vulnerabilities 
were exposed – vulnerabilities quickly recognized by the French. 
From these vulnerabilities, a carefully balanced campaign of 
patronage and deception was developed to offset French strategic 
weaknesses, inflict damage on their rivals, and protect key 
commercial and colonial interests.37 
Although Peterson’s purpose in citing these historical examples is to make 
a contemporary point about tribal networks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, he 
points out the long-term cost of engaging in inter and intra-tribal warfare.  A key 
consequence is that the victor incurs an obligation to re-order and re-structure 
the tribal environment if it is to sustain long-term state objectives.38  According to 
Kalt and Singer, the sovereignty status of tribal governments is under constant 
attack by inter-governmental pressures.39 They state: 
Over the last decade in particular, the Supreme Court has moved 
repeatedly to limit tribal powers over nonmembers. Lower courts 
have fed this process with decisions that increasingly rein in the 
ability of tribal governments to govern commerce and social affairs 
on their reservations.
 
Congress, too, has seen increasing numbers 
of bills introduced to abolish the tribes’ sovereign immunity, limit 
their taxation powers, and regulate their commerce. 
With an historical track record of tactics for exploiting tribal governments 
through the use of social trust elements as weapons — in addition to the current 
federal policies that ignore tribal sovereignty — it is little wonder then that social 
trust is now a significant impediment towards effective collaboration with tribal 
governments in homeland security initiatives.  It is the obligation of the federal 
government to move forward with legislation and actions that will improve the 
social trust necessary, and thereby improve collaboration so urgently needed in 
homeland security. 
                                            
37 Peterson, Exploiting Tribal Networks, 23. 
38 Ibid., 20. 
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C. TRUST BUILDING  
The value of the concept of social trust for understanding collaboration 
and inter-group relations has become the centerpiece of a wide range of 
academic and popular studies.  In the massive literature on how organizations 
and companies prosper, social trust is the core ingredient of corporate success; it 
is why leaders excel.  For example, the popular author of leadership guides, 
Steven Covey, outlines the basic principles of trust as well as actions that 
improve social trust both between individuals and among organizations.40  
Behaviors are defined as critical components in establishing and maintaining 
trust relationships.  Covey states: 
You can say that you recognize people as your most important 
asset.  You can say that you will comply with the rules, that you 
won’t engage in unethical practices, that you will respect a 
confidence, keep a commitment, or deliver results.  You can say all 
of these things, but unless you actually do them, your words will not 
build trust; in fact, they will destroy it.41 
D. SOCIAL TRUST INTO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
Even into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, behaviors by the federal 
government continued to destroy trust between itself and the tribal governments.  
Promises of respect for tribal sovereignty were made, and executive orders were 
given for federal agencies to work with tribal governments on a government-to-
government relationship, yet the federal government’s contradictory policy 
actions wiped away the words of trust and any hopes for future collaboration 
building.  During the 108th, 109th, and 110th  Congress, a resolution was brought 
forward to formally apologize for actions taken against tribes.  The stated intent 
of the resolution was: “To acknowledge a long history of official depredations and 
ill-conceived policies by the United States Government regarding Indian tribes 
                                            
40 Stephen M. R. Covey, The Speed of Trust, Free Press, a division of Simon and Schuster, 
Inc. 2006. 
41 Ibid., 128. 
 19
and offer an apology to all Native Peoples on behalf of the United States.”42  
Hearings conducted for S.J. Res. 15 on May 25, 2005, during the 109th 
Congress, showed mixed support for the apology resolution from tribal 
leadership.  While some leaders felt the resolution was a step forward in healing 
trust, others were not so optimistic.  The NCAI reached out to tribal leadership for 
reactions and input to the resolution. The mixed reactions were provided in 
testimony given by Tex Hall, President of the NCAI.43 
Sections of his testimony directly reflect the current social trust issues 
related to collaboration in homeland security.  In the following passages from that 
testimony, especially in the emphasized areas, Hall ties historical conflicts and 
mistrust to contemporary relations.  President Tex Hall’s testimony in its entirety 
is found in Appendix 1.   
First, it is important to recognize the intensity of the reaction of tribal 
leaders to the apology resolution, which demonstrates that the 
destructive policies addressed in this resolution are not a 
fading, distant past for Indian people.  They are present today 
and continue to be felt in very real ways every day. 
We continue to live with the legacy of the federal government's 
misguided policies of the past as well as present day policies that 
continue to undermine our ability to live as robust, healthy self-
determining people. Tribal leaders have stressed that the 
apology must recognize contemporary and not just historical 
problems in Indian-Federal Government relations. 
Despite the drafting of a resolution to apologize to Native Americans for “a 
long history of official depredations and ill-conceived policies by the United 
States government regarding Indian tribes,” the federal government continues to 
develop ill-conceived policies regarding Indian tribes.  Ignoring the sovereignty of 
tribal governments in homeland security policies, programs, and grant 
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43 Tex Hall, President, National Congress of American Indians (Senate Hearing 109-97, S.J. 
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procedures does not reflect the actions of a government that intends to correct 
past wrongs and work with tribal governments within the foundations of a 
government-to-government relationship.  Tribal leadership deserves a 
recognition and correction of current problems as well as past. 
Many Government policies continue to reflect a reluctance to truly 
recognize tribes as sovereign governments. For example, tribes, 
unlike other governments, are limited in their ability to raise money 
by issuing tax-exempt bonds. Tribes are also left out of the funds 
that the federal government has directed to every state for 
homeland security.  Tribal law enforcement agencies do not have 
the jurisdiction and resources they need to protect public safety, 
and recent Supreme Court decisions have blurred the lines of 
jurisdiction at the borders between state and tribal lands. 
Federal government policies are inconsistent in the recognition of tribal 
governments as sovereign.  This inconsistency leads to resource and 
jurisdictional complications, particularly when it comes to public safety and 
homeland security.  This inconsistency also erodes social trust for those 
collaborating with the federal government.  Trust requires consistency in action.  
Recent Supreme Court decisions have also created jurisdictional problems by 
giving tribal law enforcement no jurisdiction over non-tribal members on tribal 
lands.44 
Tribal leaders have commented that an apology may be the first 
step in reconciliation between tribes and the U.S. government, but 
for this to be true, the apology must be more than words on 
paper. There is a lot of unfinished business that must be attended 
to before true reconciliation can be achieved.  As one tribal leader 
said, apologizing does not in any way wipe the slate clean or let 
anyone off the hook.  I had the opportunity to testify before this 
committee on the President's proposed fiscal year 2006 budget. I 
said at the time, Indian people are deeply disappointed that the 
budget did not support strong self-government and self-
determination for tribes.  There were drastic cuts to many of the 
programs vital to the health and wellbeing of our people, with health 
care and medical assistance being sorely needed and under-
funded. These programs are guaranteed to us, as we know, by 
                                            
44 National Congress of American Indians (NCAI) online newsletter, available at 
http://www.ncai.org/Sovereignty_Protection.91.0.html , accessed September 2, 2007.  
 21
solemn treaties, and tribes paid for these services by ceding 
approximately three billion acres of land to the United States.  A 
strong federal commitment to make good on old promises to 
provide resources for services, prevention programs and health 
care are badly needed.”   
The NCAI website outlines the problems associated with failing trust 
obligations of the federal government.  Some of these include decreased 
appropriations for health care and other programs guaranteed to tribes.  The 
website describes this problem in the following statement: “The federal trust 
responsibility is the legal commitment made by the U.S. government to Indian 
tribes when Indian lands were ceded to the United States. This commitment is 
codified in treaties, federal law, executive orders, judicial opinions, and 
international doctrine. It can be divided into three general obligations: protection 
of Indian trust lands; protection of tribal self-governance; and provision of basic 
social, medical, and educational services for tribal members”. 
These promises notwithstanding, the U.S. government has consistently 
failed to follow through with appropriations to match these fundamental 
obligations.  In July 2003, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights reported that the 
persistent under-funding of federal trust commitments to tribes constitutes “a 
quiet crisis.” In a comprehensive analysis of unmet needs in Indian Country, the 
study documented disproportionately lower funding for critical Indian services — 
including law enforcement, health care, and education — than for all other 
populations.45 
Finally, NCAI President Tex Hall’s testimony sums up the general feeling 
of tribal leadership: 
To many an apology rings hollow when the U.S. government has 
continued to fail to fulfill these treaty promises. Only when coupled 
with a continued commitment to the government-to-
government relationship and federal Indian programs, like 
health, education and housing, can the apology resolution 
                                            
45 NCAI online newsletter, available at http://www.ncai.org/Federal_Appropriations.87.0.html, 
accessed September 2, 2007. 
 22
truly begin to make a meaningful difference for Indian tribes. 
Another tribal leader put the resolution to be like apologizing 
for stepping on someone's foot while you continue to stand on 
that foot.  
This testimony clearly shows the distrust that remains due to actions by 
the federal government that continues to undermine social trust, from unfulfilled 
treaty promises, to the exclusion of tribal governments from necessary programs.  
While current practices in homeland security that largely ignore tribal 
governments pale in comparison to historical actions legitimized by the doctrine 
of manifest destiny, formal language in homeland security policies and strategies 
that promise inclusion, without active practices to keep those commitments, 
undermine collaboration.   
The social trust required for effective collaboration must be restored 
through deeds, not words.  Homeland security funding and jurisdictional issues 
must be resolved, so that homeland security program collaboration may improve. 
We must ensure collaboration between state, tribal, and local governments in 
order to provide a seamless defense against terrorism, both foreign and 
domestic. Homeland security is a national concern, best addressed through 
cooperative programs on federal, state, tribal, and local levels. 
The repair of social trust will assist in collaborative actions on all levels 
and provide the seamless defense necessary to prevent, protect, and respond to 
disaster events both manmade and natural.  The next chapter focuses on ways 
in which social trust can perhaps be strengthened for all involved in homeland 
security efforts. 
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III. ELEMENTS OF EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION  
The rather clear history of pervasive mistrust between tribal governments 
and the federal government, and the current reality of significant impediments to 
collaboration among these sovereign nations, should make establishing social 
trust a priority for homeland security doctrine.  Social trust is a core theoretical 
element in research on collaboration, organizational success, and leadership.  It 
is difficult to incorporate, however, into bureaucratic practices and program 
initiatives organized out of a federal department.  As Kettl and others have 
argued, bureaucracy and formal rules among jurisdictions make successful 
collaboration and its root ingredient, social trust, nearly unattainable. 
The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to uncover and highlight areas of 
potential trust building between tribal and federal governments.  It takes a 
popular study of social trust and applies its core principles to the realities of tribal 
affairs.   The result is not intended to be a recipe for confidence building and 
establishing trust.  Yet, the goal is to suggest a range of specific behaviors and 
actions that could be used to initiate trust-building actions among homeland 
security leaders. 
Leadership studies have, of course, exploded during the last few decades, 
both in academic research and popular guidance.  One of the best known of 
these organizational and leadership writers is Stephen R. Covey, whose book, 
“Seven Habits of Highly Effective People,” is required reading in many executive 
leadership training courses.  With over 15 million copies sold, the book has been 
cited by over one hundred books, and untold articles since its publication in 
1990.46  It has been translated into twenty-eight languages and sold in over 
seventy countries worldwide.  The first three habits are related to personal 
responsibility, leadership, and self-management, and are the foundation to 
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improved professional relationships.  At the time, the concepts created a 
paradigm shift in leadership thinking, with a focus on personal actions that 
improve professional relationships.   
Sixteen years after publication, the author’s son, Stephen. M. R. Covey, 
published The Speed of Trust. The book focuses on how trust in relationships, 
both personal and professional, can propel positive change at rates much faster 
than a relationship that lacks trust.  Leaders have warmly received the basic 
point.  Steve Forbes, for one, says “Covey brilliantly focuses on that overlooked 
bedrock of democratic capitalism — trust.  Like the air we breathe, we too often 
take this critical intangible for granted.  As Covey makes clear, we do so at our 
ultimate competitive peril.”47   
Outside the corporate world, others have also found the focus on trust 
extremely valuable.  Catherine Crier, media analyst, summarizes her reaction to 
the argument about trust as follows: 
In the world of law and politics, the absence of trust has 
accomplished everything Stephen describes: promoting 
divisiveness and disillusionment, exacerbating bureaucratic rule-
based relationships, and, ultimately, creating beliefs and behaviors 
that serve to destroy a free and civil society. Invaluable to every 
American, The Speed of Trust delivers the tools that can restore 
transparency, honesty, and confidence to a nation in need.48 
The foundation of trust, according to Covey, exists as “waves of trust.”49  
The first wave is self-trust, which includes four cores of credibility; integrity, 
intent, capabilities, and results.  The second wave is “relationship trust” where he 
identifies several behaviors of high-trust leaders.50  The third wave is 
organizational trust,51 the fourth market trust,52 and the fifth is societal trust.53  
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50 Ibid., 136-229. 
51 Ibid., 236. 
 25
While he states that all five waves build upon each other, resulting in societal 
trust, the four cores of the first wave are a foundation, the basic origin of 
subsequent waves.  In other words, the first wave begins where the rock of trust 
first enters the pool.  The second wave, emanating from the ripple effect of the 
first wave includes the various behaviors.  These behaviors are critical to trust 
building.  The behaviors are based on principles that govern trusting 
relationships, they grow out of the four cores, they are actionable, and they are 
universal.54 These behaviors, balanced together, can generate trust between 
organizations, which will improve collaborative activities. 
The question here, however, is whether and to what extent these 
popularized behaviors that are critical to trust building may instruct homeland 
security leaders to change their current practices.  Below are selections of key 
trust-building behaviors, as developed in Covey’s work.  Each provides a 
practical lesson for homeland security leaders who should be dedicated to 
seeking and improving collaboration between the federal agencies and tribal 
governments. 
A. BEHAVIORS OF HIGH TRUST LEADERS 55   
1. Talk Straight 
The people who I have trouble dealing with…are people who tend 
to not give full information.  The purposefully leave out certain parts 
of the story — they distort the facts. 
Shelley Lazarus, Chairman and 
CEO, Ogilvy & Mather56 
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The federal government has a long history of failing to provide clear facts 
to the tribal governments concerning policy and programs.  They have stated 
support for the Executive Order mandating a government-to-government 
relationship to the National Congress of American Indians while at the same time 
ignoring the required government-to-government relationship by defining tribal 
governments as local within The Homeland Security Act.  This action has left the 
tribal governments out of the strategic planning for homeland security policy and 
programs, and denied the funding resources necessary to mitigate homeland 
security gaps on tribal lands.  This behavior has led to the belief among many 
tribes that the federal government will not support the tribal government’s 
requirements for homeland security programs. 
In his discussion of talking straight, Covey uses the example of the Hans 
Christian Anderson story, “The Emperor’s New Clothes.”57   The emperor and his 
attendants were told the clothes were made of magic cloth that could not be seen 
by stupid or unfit individuals.  Rather than talk straight and say there is no cloth, 
the farce ran its course until someone pointed out the truth.  The federal 
government has added the word tribal into many collaboration documents such 
that they read “state, local and tribal,” yet DHS works with state and local 
governments without extending the same level of coordination and assistance to 
tribal governments.  Many tribes are pointing out the truth of this disparity, yet the 
federal government has not provided a mechanism for the tribal governments to 
accomplish the collaboration in these documents.    
2. Demonstrate Respect  
I try to treat people as human beings…If they know you care, it 
brings out the best in them. 
Sir Richard Branson, Founder and 
Chairman, The Virgin Group58 
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The federal government has a long history of disrespect towards the 
culture and values of the tribal governments.  When developing the border 
between Mexico and the United States after the War of 1812, the international 
line was drawn through the Tohono O’odham Nation — dividing the tribe and 
families. No one gave a thought to the indigenous people and the tribes whose 
land was now divided. With the increased focus of illegal immigration across the 
southern border, members of the Tohono O’odham tribe are often stopped, 
searched, and returned to Mexico.  Eileen Luna-Firebaugh argues that “The tribal 
governments have attempted to resolve these issues through meetings and 
conciliations, which to date have not shown much success. The federal officials 
have not indicated full support of tribal sovereignty, particularly if it would require 
seriously addressing tribal concerns. Instead, federal officials have generally 
responded to the concerns as if they were being communicated by a local 
government, rather than by a sovereign nation.”59   
The respect that the federal government owes to tribal governments is not 
rendered in many cases.  Testimony makes it clear that tribal leaders are given 
the opportunity to make statements to Congress, and there is a great deal of 
testimony regarding homeland security issues.  Yet no action is taken to address 
the issues they bring to Congress. 
3. Create Transparency  
Try to be transparent, clear, and truthful.  Even when it is difficult, 
and above all when it is difficult.  
Jean-Cypril Spinetta, Chairman and 
CEO, Air France60 
 
There is currently no transparency between DHS and tribal governments 
related to homeland security policy, funding, and programs.  There is no Office of 
                                            
59 Eileen Luna-Firebaugh, “‘Att Hascu ‘Am O ‘I-oi? What Direction Should We Take?: The 
Desert People’s Approach to the Militarization of the Border,” Washington University in St. Louis 
Journal of Law & Policy 19:338.  
60 Covey,  153.  
 28
Tribal Affairs to provide the transparency afforded tribes through other federal 
agencies.  As previously outlined in Chapter I, states often do not invite tribes to 
participate in strategic planning sessions or grant proposal meetings.  According 
to the National Native American Law Enforcement Association (NNALEA) 2002 
Homeland Security Summit report, states were recently asked to address the 
inclusion of tribes in their planning for Emergency Operations Centers. Only 
fourteen of the thirty-five states with Indian reservations did so. Of these 
fourteen, only one was willing to provide funds to tribes for staffing improvements 
in Indian response capabilities.61  Transparency between DHS, states, and tribal 
governments would provide the mechanism necessary for tribes to fully 
understand and engage in homeland security programs and policies.   
4. Right Wrongs 
To know what is right and not to do it is the worst cowardice. 
        — Confucius62 
 
Resolutions have been brought to the House and the Senate during the 
past three sessions of Congress to “acknowledge a long history of official 
depredations and ill-conceived policies by the United States Government 
regarding Indian tribes and offer an apology to all Native Peoples on behalf of the 
United States.”  Yet the testimony offered during the hearings for the resolution 
shows that these are just words.  The United States continues to ignore the tribal 
government’s rights to participate in federal decisions and policy making that 
affects tribal lands.  It is an empty apology and, despite knowing the right thing to 
do, the federal government continues to take no action to do those right things.  
Hearings for S.578 have been held to correct the definition of tribal governments 
as local within The Homeland Security Act, and yet no action was taken to pass 
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that bill.  It was dropped from the legers after the 109th Congress due to lack of 
action, and has not been raised again during the 110th Congress. 
5. Get Better  
You learn nothing from your successes except to think too much of 
yourself.  It is from failure that all growth comes, provided you can 
recognize it, admit it, learn from it, rise [above] it, and then try 
again. 
       — Dee Hock, Founder and Former CEO, VISA International 63 
DHS would be best advised to follow the lead of other federal agencies 
that have developed a government-to-government relationship with tribal 
governments.  The EPA has established a strong working relationship with tribal 
governments since 1994.  The NNALEA report states of the EPA, “EPA 
maintains a smooth working relationship with Indian nations and tribes on a 
government-to-government basis.  It has many grants and agreements with 
tribes and provides training, technical expertise and other assistance, as 
requested. The EPA believes that joint training and joint operations are essential 
before disasters occur. Its training serves the dual purpose of detecting 
environment crimes as well as preparing first responders for terrorist attacks 
involving chemical, radiological and other environment contaminants.”64 
6. Confront Reality  
You must never confuse faith that your will prevail in the end — 
which you can never afford to lose — with the discipline to confront 
the most brutal facts of your current reality, whatever they might be. 
— Admiral James Stockdale,65 
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 “Confront Reality is based on the principles of courage, responsibility, 
awareness, and respect.”66  The reality of Homeland Security as outlined in 
numerous congressional hearings and tribal association reports is that there are 
weaknesses in our homeland security plans by not including tribal governments 
in the process.  It is important to secure our entire nation, not just pieces.  Tribal 
governments are expected to meet the requirements for homeland security, yet 
they receive no funding from the federal government.  Very often, the tribes are 
not provided the funding necessary for them to meet basic public safety 
requirements. According to the NNALEA Homeland Security Summit report,  
Current funding for tribal law enforcement and first responders lags 
well behind that for non-tribal law enforcement and first responders. 
The result is that many Tribal law enforcement and first responder 
programs lack personnel, and the personnel they do have may 
need training, education, certification, experience, and sufficient 
technical assistance, while many experience burn-out resulting in 
low retention rates. Therefore, the cost will be higher to attain parity 
in law enforcement and first responder programs on Indian lands.  
According to Senator Campbell, “Indian tribal law enforcement 
officers are often the first and only responders to crimes committed 
against Indians and non-Indians on Indian lands.” In addition, Tribal 
lands have critical unmet needs for medical capacity, emergency 
response planning, and emergency service implementation.67  
7. Clarify Expectations  
Almost all conflict is a result of violated expectations. 
  — Blaine Lee, Author of The Power Principle68 
 
When treaties were signed with tribal governments, there was an 
expectation that the words on paper would be honored.  When E.O. 13175 was 
written, mandating all federal agencies work with tribal governments in a 
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government-to-government relationship, there was an expectation that the order 
would be followed.  In many cases, it was, and the EPA is a prime example.  
There is a respect between tribal governments and the EPA due the relationship 
created by the EPA as government-to-government with the tribes. When DHS 
was created, there was an expectation that tribal governments would be included 
in homeland security planning within a government-to-government relationship. 
Instead, they were defined as local governments, and that mistake has not yet 
been corrected, despite multiple hearings and testimony. There are often 
statements made by the uneducated in public and government service that the 
tribal governments should not be treated as “special.”  Yet it has been through 
treaties and laws that the status of tribal sovereignty has prevailed.  States 
respect each other’s sovereign status, and citizens are expected to follow the 
laws developed in each state, though they may differ from state to state. 
Homeland security leaders also respect the sovereignty of states and are 
accountable to the needs of the state governments as they relate to homeland 
security, sovereignty, and federalism.  As such, the sovereignty of tribal 
governments should be provided the same respect and accountability of 
homeland security leadership.   
8. Keep Commitments  
Always deliver what you say you will.  Never make a promise that 
you can’t follow through on.  The way you really build trust, in a 
sense, is through crucibles.  You have to show that you will do your 
part, even if it is difficult. 
                                  —Dennis Ross, Former U.S. Ambassador69 
Executive Order 13175 states that the United States will interact with tribal 
governments in a government-to-government relationship.  The Homeland 
Security Act ignores that order by defining tribal governments as local 
governments.  The Homeland Security Act states that the mission of DHS is to 
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(A) prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; (B) reduce the vulnerability 
of the United States to terrorism; (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the 
recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States; (D) carry 
out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including acting as a 
focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.70    
Tribal governments are unable to assist in meeting the goals of the 
Homeland Security Act based on their definition of local governments, since that 
definition denies them access to resources and funding that would enable them 
to participate in the mission.71  The federal government has acknowledged the 
mistake, has acknowledged multiple broken promises to the tribal governments, 
and yet still no action is taken to correct those deficiencies. The federal 
government’s responsibility is to address this issue, and work with tribal 
governments in a government-to-government relationship as promised through 
years of treaties, laws, and executive orders.  Only then will tribes be able to fully 
participate in the homeland security mission and achieve the goals of security for 
their people and the United States. 
9. Extend Trust 
Trust men and they will be true to you; treat them greatly and they 
will show themselves great. 
     —Ralph Waldo Emerson72 
In their paper, Kalt and Singer point out the benefits of tribal sovereignty 
and show how tribes move past dependency on federal funding and create their  
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own economic success through self rule.  Through extensive research with the 
Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development, they extracted 
these examples of success: 
Supported by every U.S. President since the 1960s and bolstered, 
for a time, by a combination of federal court rulings and 
congressional policies, tribal self-rule – sovereignty – has proven to 
be the only policy that has shown concrete success in breaking 
debilitating economic dependence on federal spending programs 
and replenishing the social and cultural fabric that can support 
vibrant and healthy communities and families.
 
While gaming 
enterprises of tribes’ governments garner most of the attention, 
self-rule is creating more and more economic success stories in 
Indian Country – from the virtual elimination of tribal unemployment 
and the boom in non-Indian hirings in the factories and other 
operations of the Mississippi Choctaw,
 
to the cutting of 
unemployment from 70% to 13% in six years via the non-gaming 
businesses of the Winnebago Tribe’s (Nebraska) Ho-Chunk Inc. 
Gaming success itself is spurring self-sufficiency, as tribes such as 
Oneida (New York) and Mille Lacs (Minnesota) take the step of 
eschewing federal funding. And the success of self-determination is 
not solely economic – as when Mississippi Choctaw plows the fruits 
of economic development into dramatic improvements in public 
safety and health care delivery, Mille Lacs is able to invest in 
award-winning efforts to replenish Native language use, and 
Jicarilla Apache (New Mexico) and White Mountain Apache (New 
Mexico) are able to take control of wildlife and forest management 
with professionalism and results perhaps unmatched by any 
government anywhere.73 
 
There are those within the federal government that feel it is too 
complicated to provide tribal governments direct homeland security funding.74  
Yet, even states are having a hard time meeting the funding mandates and 
required goals for grants they receive.  In response, the federal government has 
provided guidance and assistance to the states. Tribal governments deserve this 
same level of respect and trust that they can use direct funding appropriately, 
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once a mechanism is in place within DHS to provide the funding as well as 
 the guidance and assistance on programs.   
B. SUMMARY 
The security of the United States is weakened by the lack of collaboration 
between the federal government and tribal governments.  Essential to 
collaborating successfully is to build a strong sense of social trust among the 
leaders and organizations.  Each of the trust-building behaviors highlighted 
above offers an opportunity for homeland security leaders to change current 
practices to begin to foster that social trust.  Currently, though, the lessons have 
not been learned. 
The president has identified the need to build and support an effective 
homeland security leadership cadre across the federal agencies.  The ability to 
work collaboratively with state, local and tribal partners, within the vast diversity 
of historical and legal guidelines, is a core leadership skill.  Learning how to 
establish and sustain social trust where it has been missing is crucial to the 
success of a homeland security strategy. 
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IV. COLLABORATIVE ACTIONS 
Despite the many examples of distrust in federal-tribal relationships, there 
are some examples of effective trust relationships though federal agencies that 
have met the mandate of EO 13175 and developed a government-to-government 
relationship with tribes.  Moreover, in the absence of federal guidance in 
homeland security issues, some states are reaching out and forming 
collaborative relationships with the tribal governments within their state.  This 
chapter provides examples of relationships and collaborations that are both 
successful and effective because they incorporate the elements of social trust 
behaviors outlined in Chapters II and III, and improve collaboration with tribal 
governments in homeland security.   
After ten years of direct government-to-government collaboration with 
tribal governments, the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
established their Office of Indian Affairs in May 1994.75  Since renamed the 
American Indian Environmental Office (AEIO), this office works closely with tribal 
governments to ensure all legislation developed by the EPA and impacting tribal 
lands is developed in close collaboration with tribal governments.  The AEIO 
mission as stated on their website is: “The American Indian Environmental Office 
(AIEO) coordinates the Agency-wide effort to strengthen public health and 
environmental protection in Indian country, with a special emphasis on helping 
tribes administer their own environmental programs.”76  They have also included 
on that website an “American Indian Tribal Portal” with the following mission: 
“The American Indian Environmental Office developed the tribal portal to help 
American Indian communities and supporters locate tribal related information 
within EPA and other government agencies.”77 
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Through these actions, the EPA is exhibiting several of the behaviors 
Covey has outlined as necessary for social trust building: talk straight, 
demonstrate respect, keep commitments, extend trust, and create transparency.  
Through the AIEO and website, they have talked straight by providing information 
to tribes regarding policies and programs in development; they have 
demonstrated respect by providing a mechanism for tribal input into the 
processes; they have kept commitments by maintaining a government-to-
government relationship with the tribes; they have extended trust by utilizing 
tribal feedback in the EPA policy and programs process; and they have created 
transparency by providing an office and a website specifically designed to keep 
tribes aware of the policies and programs that affect tribal lands and 
governments.  As a result of these behaviors, they maintain a good working 
relationship with tribal governments.  As stated in the NNALEA report (and, 
although previously stated in this thesis, it bears repeating), “EPA maintains a 
smooth working relationship with Indian nations and tribes on a government-to-
government basis.  It has many grants and agreements with tribes and provides 
training, technical expertise and other assistance, as requested. The EPA 
believes that joint training and joint operations are essential before disasters 
occur. Its training serves the dual purpose of detecting environment crimes as 
well as preparing first responders for terrorist attacks using chemical, radiological 
and other environment contaminants.”78   
The EPA is also exhibiting another of Covey’s trust behaviors by getting 
better. They have sponsored a Memorandum of Understanding between 
themselves, the U. S. Department of Agriculture, the U. S. Department of Interior, 
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of Housing and Urban Development to “improve infrastructure on tribal lands and 
to focus efforts on providing access to safe drinking water and basic wastewater 
facilities to tribes.”79 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) finalized their 
agency policy for government-to-government relations with American Indians in 
September 1998 after initial development began in June 1997.80  Sections within 
the FEMA policy state: 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency acknowledges the 
trust relationship between Federal Government and American 
Indians and Alaska Native Tribal governments as established by 
specific treaties, court decisions, statutes, executive orders, 
regulations, and policies. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency will encourage 
cooperation and partnership between and among Federal, Tribal, 
State, and local governments to resolve issues of mutual concern 
related to emergency management.     
FEMA policy clearly placed tribal government on equal footing with federal 
and state government. Despite being absorbed into DHS during the creation of 
the new federal department, FEMA has attempted to continue their previous work 
through the government-to-government relationship policy they had established 
by providing information to the tribes on various FEMA topics such as grants and 
training.81  On their website, they have established a tribal government fact sheet 
to provide answers to questions regarding the grant process and eligibility.82  
They provide a specific section for their Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program grants.  
One outstanding feature they have developed within their training programs is a 
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course titled: “Building Partnerships with Tribal Governments.”83  In the course 
description, they reiterate social trust and relationship elements as previously 
mentioned by Boslego and Covey: “Effective partnerships form and evolve 
because the individual partners have an understanding, appreciation, and 
respect for one another that they acquire through education and life experiences. 
This course is designed to provide the basic knowledge to build effective 
partnerships with tribal governments and to work in concert with them to protect 
native people and their property against all types of hazards.”84 
The U. S. Department of Health and Human Services has a long 
relationship with the tribes through the Indian Health Service (IHS).  IHS has 
provided healthcare to tribal people since the Snyder Act of 1921 provided 
federal funding for the provision of health care to Indian Tribes.85  Public Law 93-
638, The Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, provided the 
opportunity for tribal governments to either assume administration and operation 
of the health care in their communities using IHS provided resources, or to 
remain within the IHS administered system.86  Since the Self Determination Act 
passed, American Indian Tribes and Native Alaskan corporations administer 15 
hospitals, 229 health centers, 116 health stations, and 162 Alaskan village 
clinics.87  In 1976, Congress passed the Indian Healthcare Improvement Act in 
an effort to improve the health status of American Indians and Alaska Natives to 
at least parity with the rest of the U.S. population.  The act was reauthorized four 
times, but expired in 2001, and has not been reauthorized since, despite 
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numerous hearings.88  Although a disparity in health care between the general 
U.S. population and American Indians and Alaska Natives is recognized, there 
have been no studies conducted to determine if health care in tribally operated 
systems is better or worse than that those that remain in the IHS system.   
A. TRIBAL/STATE COLLABORATION   
In absence of federal guidance towards homeland security collaboration, 
some states are beginning to reach out to the tribal governments within their 
boundaries to develop cooperative agreements. Arizona has twenty-two federally 
recognized tribes that reside within the state.  In an attempt to ensure the state 
has effectively collaborated with these sovereign nations in homeland security 
planning efforts, Arizona has included a tribal government representative in each 
of its homeland security Regional Advisory Councils (RACs).89 The Arizona 
Department of Homeland Security states “five homeland security regions were 
identified to ensure the state — through the Regional Advisory Councils — 
strengthen its ability to work together at all levels to address common threat and 
vulnerability issues and encourage the sharing of resources across town, city, 
county and tribal lines.”90   Although the stated goal is certainly a step towards 
collaboration, there is currently no evidence through RAC reporting that there has 
been consistent collaboration with tribal governments throughout the five RACs.   
B. TRIBAL GOVERNMENT COLLABORATION EFFORTS IN ARIZONA 
During the 25th Arizona Indian Town Hall meeting held June 6-8, 2005, 
over one hundred representatives from federal, state, local, and tribal 
governments gathered to discuss the current homeland security issues facing 
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Arizona tribal communities.91  While most participants agreed that DHS must 
work with tribal governments in a government-to-government relationship, until 
that takes place, participants agreed that tribes should continue to foster 
collaborative relationships with state and local governments to ensure the 
security of the tribal lands and populations.  The report outlines multiple 
recommendations and outlines model collaboration programs within the state for 
other tribes to utilize.  The Gila River Indian Community’s emergency plan and 
program were cited as a model for other tribes to use.  Gila River used the state’s 
emergency plan and developed a plan incorporating cultural and community 
values. The Navajo Rangers interoperable communications system was also 
cited as a model.  The Navajo Rangers are part of the Navajo Nation Parks 
Department and coordinated with the state for interoperable communications. 
Despite some of the positive models of collaboration, trust was again identified 
as a significant impediment to collaboration. Some tribal representatives felt that 
by signing Intergovernmental Agreements (IGAs) with the state or counties, they 
would compromise their sovereignty status.92  There was also a reluctance 
expressed by some tribes to participate in regionalization.93   
Participants in the town hall meeting cited the Northern RAC as a good 
model of coordination.  It contains a tribal sub-committee of the eight tribes in the 
region, composed of tribal leaders, police chiefs, fire chiefs, and emergency 
responders.94  Each RAC includes a tribal representative and, in the case of the 
Northern RAC, the tribal representative to the RAC serves as the chair of the 
tribal sub-committee.  This process allows all the tribes in the region to express 
their concerns and to have those concerns brought to the regional council 
meetings.  This mechanism effectively provides for tribal collaboration in the 
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development of homeland security plans.  Another area identified as a challenge 
during the town hall meeting was communication and information.  Many tribal 
representatives in attendance felt uninformed regarding homeland security 
programs and policy, both at the state and federal level.  Many were unaware of 
training offered by FEMA, both online and through grant programs.  Others were 
also unaware of the resources used by some tribes such as Gila River and the 
Navajo for their collaboration efforts. Participants in the town hall meeting 
recommended that the Inter Tribal Council of Arizona take the lead in 
coordinating the outreach and education for Arizona tribes regarding resources 
available and how access to those resources can best be accomplished.95   
The federal-tribal collaborative successes as well as the state-tribal 
collaborative success were direct results of trusted relationships.  Tribes that had 
established trusted relationships with the state and local governments were, by 
far, more willing to collaborate than those that had not experienced those levels 
of trust or had antagonistic relationships with these entities.   An organization 
such as the Inter Tribal Council of Arizona could help develop the trust and 
establish collaborative relationships as long as federal and state leadership 
worked equally as hard at establishing and maintaining the trust through their 
own behaviors.   
                                            
95 Johnson, Arizona Commission of Indian Affairs, 4. 
 42




The current lack of policy or strategy for collaboration with tribal 
governments leaves weaknesses within homeland security.  Without effective 
collaboration and communication with the over 560 tribal nations within the 
United States, we are unable to answer the National Preparedness Goal 
questions: How prepared are we? How prepared do we need to be? How do we 
prioritize efforts to close the gap?   
A. COLLABORATION OPPORTUNITIES 
By its own strategic principles, the challenge before the Department of 
Homeland Security is to find ways to dramatically increase collaboration with 
tribal governments.  Surprisingly, the path forward may not be as difficult as it 
appears given the dismal history of intergovernmental relations.  An initial step 
would involve recognition of established grounds for cooperation — the 
sovereignty of tribal nations upon which relationships with the federal 
government have been based for several decades.  DHS could lead this formal 
recognition and embrace conformity with legal and policy precedents. 
DHS would also find opportunities for improved collaboration in the 
relatively small forums that have emerged to discuss homeland security needs in 
the absence of federal leadership.  Forums that range from the NNALEA 
summits to Arizona Town Hall meetings, offer examples of serious, if small-scale, 
discussions of homeland security gaps on tribal lands.  More importantly, they 
also gather tribal leaders who are actively interested in identifying mechanisms to 
help close the security lapses. 
Perhaps the most difficult challenge for DHS leadership, however, is 
institutional and cultural.  For DHS to form an effective collaborative relationship 
with tribal governments, it must embrace a strategy of leadership that fully 
acknowledges the crucial role of trust in achieving effective partnerships.  Just as 
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trust-building measures are critical to difficult negotiations among independent 
nations; trust building is an essential part of constructing homeland security.  No 
single office or liaison or speech will overcome the past decades and the current 
dismissive treatment of tribal governments.  In each priority area, DHS needs to 
acknowledge the significance of tribal lands and tribal governments in sustaining 
a comprehensive, national strategy for homeland security. 
The final chapter proposes several actions that the federal government, 
including both the executive and legislative branches, could take to transform 
collaboration with tribal governments.  It begins with a few examples of 
cooperative activity to suggest that DHS does not have to work alone.  These 
examples, however, are as comprehensive as the challenges before the 
Department of Homeland Security.  The important first step, though, is to begin 
building trust by showing the respect that tribal governments deserve. 
B. ACTION AND TRUST BUILDING IN COLLABORATION 
From the outset of this thesis, the argument has focused on the ways in 
which the language of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 spun tribal-federal 
relations off into an unproductive direction.  As a result, DHS’ strategy should 
focus on a comprehensive legislative package to authorize and appropriate the 
funds to support a Tribal Homeland Security Initiative.  Such legislation, however, 
will require a series of preparatory steps to identify direction and build 
widespread support. 
A strategic planning process could involve three major steps:   
First, Congress and the administration could establish a multiparty 
advisory commission to lead the review of tribal homeland security needs and 
interests.  Tribal associations, including NCAI, NNALEA, and others, would 
participate in the commission as part of the process that would lead to a national 
tribal summit.  The summit, hosted by tribal governments, would bring their 
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federal counterparts together to hear from states and local governments, as well 
as the private sector, about how to collaborate on homeland security needs. 
Second, on its own initiative or under congressional direction, DHS should 
establish an Office of Tribal Affairs to incorporate tribal perspectives and interests 
within core homeland security policy and program deliberations.  The office 
would need to be far more substantial than DHS’ current tribal liaison, given both 
the number of individual tribes with which to consult and coordinate, and the 
range of homeland security issues with which tribal lands and governments 
overlap. 
The EPA’s American Indian Environmental Office offers useful ideas for 
such an institutional reform.  Through this office, EPA has been able to provide 
valuable consultation to tribal governments and receive useful input on many 
projects of common concern and interest.  Collaborative successes, for instance, 
have occurred in projects related to air quality, clean water access, and 
wastewater systems. Although the EPA and tribal governments have had their 
share of troubled encounters, they have also accomplished collaborative projects 
that were clearly founded on trusted relationships. EPA has organized itself in 
branches designed to work specifically with tribal interests or on projects 
involving tribal lands.  These branches serve as transparent, routinized linkages 
directly between tribal members and federal government officials. 
A separate office for tribal affairs is not the only way to organize 
collaborative relationships.  Before integration into DHS, the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) had established a network approach to tribal 
involvement.  FEMA’s institutionalized role of providing grants and training 
opportunities for emergency planners and responders were routinely and 
transparently provided to all tribal leaders and Bureau of Indian Affairs 
representatives in all regions.  FEMA’s outreach and training on emergency 
management and disaster mitigation were able to reach tribal fire services, for 
instance, that allowed opportunities of extensive cooperation between tribal 
governments and federal, state and local first responders during crisis moments.  
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An established office, however, may make sustained, successful outreach 
more likely, especially on a wider range of homeland security issues.  The 
recently formed National Native American Fire Chiefs Association (NNAFCA), for 
instance, provides a clear view of the value of an institution that incorporates the 
perspective and experience of tribal firefighters and first responders.  The 
president of NNAFCA described their goal as follows:   
We want our members to develop and maintain relationships with 
neighboring jurisdictions, counties, and states to ensure each 
other’s capabilities and limitations are identified and work to fill the 
gaps together, particularly in regard to homeland security issues.96 
These efforts, however, also demonstrate the limits of relatively narrow 
outreach programs.  The primary problem is that many tribes are unaware of the 
training and collaborative opportunities.  Comments made during the Arizona 
Indian Town Hall meetings described in Chapter IV, for example, clearly showed 
that many tribal participants were simply unaware of these resources.  Trust, as 
shown in Chapter III, involves both communication and transparency.  Neither 
tribal governments nor the federal government can reach out effectively without 
greater knowledge of each other. 
The state-tribal collaboration in Arizona seems to work well because its 
Inter Tribal Council (ITCA) organizes and sustains this communication.  The 
ITCA maintains a website, for example, that lists representatives for each of the 
collaborative projects underway in the area.  These include state-tribal projects, 
federal-tribal projects, and tribal-tribal joint programs.  Although the website 
offers details of specific environmental projects in which tribes partnered with the 
EPA, it includes very little information on homeland security.  No information is 
included, for instance, on the homeland security Regional Advisory Councils 
(RACs), which is Arizona’s way to organize joint discussions and planning efforts 
in which tribes could participate.   
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The Indian Health Service should also be represented in this new office.  
IHS is the conduit that many tribes currently turn to for their public health 
capabilities and planning.  These include medical surge capabilities and 
emergency medical services.  The IHS currently serves under the Department of 
Health and Human Services.  DHS’s Office of Tribal Affairs should maintain an 
awareness of the security and planning gaps that currently exist within the IHS-
DHHS framework and a capability to offer tribal governments a coherent, direct 
federal-to-tribal government strategy toward preparedness for health-related 
risks.    
The third element of a process that leads to a comprehensive legislative 
approach to tribal engagement in homeland security would involve a concerted 
risk identification and needs assessment process.  Perhaps as part of the 
national commission, or an independent congressional directive, a thorough 
assessment is necessary to fully document the range of homeland security 
issues that involved tribal governments and tribal lands.  The legal obligation of 
the federal government — in its relations with the sovereign, yet dependent tribal 
nations — is to identify and acknowledge the risks, vulnerabilities, and potential 
consequences for tribes and surrounding governments of all-hazards threats.   
For state and local governments, this comprehensive assessment is made 
through various grant applications and sector specific programs, such as those 
involving port security or critical infrastructure.  As noted earlier, tribal 
governments do not have much of an opportunity to express their views and 
vulnerabilities in grant processes when they have to compete with local and state 
government needs, especially when they have to work through the state to have 
their projects even recognized. 
From the outset, however, the focus of such assessments should not be 
devoted to the perceived or proclaimed special needs of tribal governments.  
Legislative and DHS strategic goals require collaboration.  The purpose of 
realigning the grant processes and various programs to incorporate tribal 
governments should be to empower them to collaborate with their federal 
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partners.   NNALEA’s participation in the Border Security study (described in 
Chapter I) demonstrates one of myriad ways in which federal and tribal 
authorities and security interests overlap and intertwine.  The nationwide tribal 
assessment should produce an agenda for a joint federal-tribal approach to 
overcoming the homeland security weaknesses found on tribal lands. 
Finally, although these legislative, institutional and research outcomes are 
critical objectives, the strategic planning process leading to a comprehensive 
legislative response is itself an opportunity at trust building and, therefore, 
successful, interagency collaboration. The process would produce, even require, 
trust behaviors, as described earlier in Chapter III, which demonstrate respect, 
create transparency, and confront reality. 
Trust behaviors would also be embedded in the legislation.  In order to 
produce effective legislation, the process would need to clarify expectations.  
Currently, the confused definition of tribal authorities and responsibilities in 
homeland security, the new distinction between eligible and not eligible tribes, 
and the overall neglect of tribal concerns directly weakens homeland security 
programs and projects by obstructing participation of key communities.   
The test of how successful the process and the legislation would be is 
relatively straightforward.  At the beginning of this chapter, I observed that, 
without effective collaboration between federal and over five hundred and sixty 
tribal governments — many of which occupy critical lands and locations for 
homeland security — it was impossible to answer the core preparedness 
questions:  How prepared are we? How prepared do we need to be? How do we 
prioritize efforts to close the gap?   Trustworthy, collaborative efforts between 
sovereign tribal governments and their federal and state partners must result in 
the ability to describe what the security risks are and how, working together, they 
will be overcome.  The task is a shared responsibility, allowing and encouraging 
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Dosha! Good morning Chairman McCain, Vice-Chairman Dorgan and 
members of the Committee. My name is Tex Hall, and I am President of the 
National Congress of American Indians and Chairman of the Mandan, Hidatsa 
and Arikara Nation of North Dakota. 
NCAI is the oldest and largest American Indian organization in the United 
States. I sit before you today representing over 250 tribal governments and 
thousands of Indian people. NCAI was founded in 1944 in response to 
termination and assimilation policies that the United States forced upon the tribal 
governments in contradiction of their treaty rights and status as sovereign 
governments. Today NCAI remains dedicated to protecting the rights of tribal 
governments to achieve self-determination and self-sufficiency.  On behalf of 
NCAI, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify in regard to S.J. Res. 15, 
which would acknowledge the many misdeeds of the United States in its 
interaction with Native Americans and recognize and honor the importance of 
Native Americans to this land and to our nation - in the past and today. I also 
want to thank Senator Sam Brownback for his leadership in introducing this 
resolution and Senators Boxer, Dodd, Inouye, Dorgan, Cochran, and Akaka for 
co-sponsoring the Apology Resolution. 
We all know the atrocities wrought against Native people in the United 
States — the holocaust, the land theft, the forced removals, the boarding school 
experience completely wiping out the language and cultures of our Native 
brothers and sisters, the broken treaties, and the attempts to undermine our 
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status as sovereign nations. Passage of the Apology Resolution would mark the 
federal government's first effort to extend an official apology for the years of 
wrongdoing in interactions with Indian tribes.  It is a long-time coming. 
A similar Apology Resolution enumerating the various wrongdoings of the 
United States government in relation to the Native Hawaiians and the Kingdom of 
Hawai’i was passed and signed into law by President Clinton in 1993. The 
Canadian government likewise apologized to its First peoples in 1998.  The NCAI 
leadership worked with Congressional leadership in the last Congress to analyze 
the impact of this landmark resolution, which was first introduced during the 
108th Congress by Senator Brownback, for himself, Senator Ben Nighthorse 
Campbell and Senator Inouye. NCAI solicited responses to the proposed 
language from tribal leaders and facilitated discussion among tribal leadership 
and Congress on the issue. tribal leadership across Indian Country continues to 
give a variety of responses to the Apology Resolution, and I would like to share 
some of those responses with you today. 
First, it is important to recognize that the intensity of the reaction of tribal 
leaders to the Apology Resolution demonstrates that the destructive policies 
addressed in this resolution are not a fading distant past for Indian peoples; they 
are present harms that continue to be felt in very real ways every day. We 
continue to live with the legacy of the federal government’s misguided policies of 
the past, as well as present day policies that undermine our ability to live as 
robust, healthy, self-determining peoples. Tribal leaders have stressed that the 
apology must recognize contemporary, and not just historical, problems in Indian-
government relations. 
Many government policies continue to reflect a reluctance to truly 
recognize tribes as sovereigns. For example, tribes, unlike other governments, 
are limited in their ability to raise money by issuing tax-exempt bonds. Tribes are 
also left out of the funds that the federal government has directed to every state 
in this nation for emergency response and homeland security. Tribal law 
enforcement agencies do not have the jurisdiction and resources they need to 
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protect public safety, and recent Supreme Court decisions have blurred the lines 
of jurisdiction at the borders between state and tribal lands. 
Tribal leaders have commented that an apology may be the first step in a 
reconciliation process between tribes and the United States government, but for 
this to be true, the apology must be more than just words on paper. There is 
much unfinished business that must be attended to before true reconciliation can 
be achieved. As one tribal leader has said, apologizing does not in any way wipe 
the slate clean or let anyone off the hook. 
I had the opportunity recently to testify before this committee on the 
president’s proposed budget for FY 2006. As I said at the time, Indian people are 
deeply disappointed that this budget does not support strong tribal self-
government and self-determination. The president has proposed drastic budget 
cuts to many of the programs that are vital to the health and wellbeing of our 
people. For example, American Indians and Alaska Natives have a life 
expectancy five years less than all other races in this country and suffer from 
high rates of diabetes, heart disease, suicide, cancer, and alcoholism. Despite 
these health disparities, the per capita expenditure for American Indian and 
Alaska Native medical services is less than one-third of the average annual 
expenditure for individual Medicaid assistance, and is even less than the nation’s 
per capita health expenditure for federal prisoners. These programs are 
guaranteed to us by solemn treaties, and tribes paid for these services by ceding 
about three billion acres of land to the federal government. A strong federal 
commitment to make good on old promises to provide resources for services, 
prevention programs, and healthcare facilities is badly needed to turn around the 
troubling health statistics in Indian Country and is an important step toward 
reconciliation. 
To many, an apology rings hollow when the United States government is 
continuing to fail to fulfill its treaty promises. Only when coupled with a continued 
commitment to the government-to-government relationship and to federal Indian 
programs like health, education, and housing, can the Apology Resolution truly 
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begin to make a meaningful difference for Indian tribes. Otherwise, as one tribal 
leader put it, the Resolution will be like apologizing for stepping on someone’s 
foot while you continue to stand on it. 
The message I would like to leave you with today is that passage of the 
Apology Resolution may be an important and meaningful first step toward 
reconciliation.  Native Americans have come through extraordinarily trying times 
over the past two centuries, and we have emerged strong. Native Americans are 
the fastest-growing segment of the population by percentage — in the face of 
policies aimed at ensuring our destruction, we have chosen survival. However, 
we have a long way to go. An apology implies a recognition that an injustice 
occurred, and the importance of this recognition cannot be underestimated. It 
also implies, however, that there is a will to try to do something about the harms 
that caused by that injustice. True healing must begin with a recognition of the 
harm, but it cannot stop there. An apology cannot substitute for upholding the 
hundreds of treaties made with Indian nations and fully living up to the federal 
trust responsibility. Tribal leaders have cautioned that the apology will be 
meaningless if it is not accompanied by actions that begin to correct the wrongs 
of the past and the present. Indian sovereignty is still under threat, and Indian 
people are still being left behind in this country. We look forward to working with 
you as we move forward in taking the next steps toward reconciliation and 
securing the future for Indian peoples. 
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